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INTRODUCTION 
The estate tax treatment of publicity rights factors into the debate regarding 
whether such rights should be transferrable at death.  Some point to the estate tax as 
a reason for making publicity rights non-transferrable.  For if they are transferrable, 
estate-tax inclusion could result.  And, the argument goes, the estate or the 
beneficiaries could well be coerced into commercializing the rights in order to raise 
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the money to pay the tax.  Making them nontransferable would eliminate this 
possibility.  This Article considers some of the connections between the federal estate 
tax and the state law treatment of publicity rights.  It concludes with a suggestion 
about the tax treatment of publicity rights at a more general level. 
Part I explores the estate tax treatment of publicity rights and, in particular, the 
provision the celebrity Robin Williams used in his will in order to address his 
apparent concern about forced commercialization.  While the provision appears to 
be based on dicta in the Ninth Circuit, its effectiveness is questionable.  This Part 
concludes with a recommendation that legislation at the state level permit celebrities 
to extinguish during life their post-death publicity rights.  With such legislation in 
place, the concern about forced commercialization would be eliminated—thus 
permitting the state law question of transferability to be resolved solely on the basis 
of non-tax considerations. 
Part II considers the characterization of post-death publicity rights as an 
independent right under state legislation and the estate tax implications of such a 
characterization.  An analogy is made to the estate-tax treatment of wrongful death 
proceeds, which are typically characterized as independent of the victim’s pre-death 
claim and are therefore not included in the gross estate. 
Part III examines two ancillary estate-tax issues that can arise where state law 
authorizes transferability:  first, the impact of retroactive state legislation making 
publicity rights transferrable in the case of a decedent dying prior to enactment; and, 
second, the impact of a movement away from traditional choice-of-law rules in this 
context. 
Part IV concludes with a broader suggestion:  that the estate tax be made entirely 
inapplicable to publicity rights without regard to the state law question of 
transferability.  Instead, the proceeds from the exploitation of these rights would be 
fully taxable as income to the beneficiaries when received, obviating the need to 
engage in a difficult, potentially protracted inquiry into the valuation of the rights at 
the time of death. 
I. FORCED COMMERCIALIZATION:  THE FLAW IN THE ROBIN 
WILLIAMS ESTATE PLAN AND SUGGESTED REFORM  
Robin Williams included an interesting provision in his will relating to his 
publicity rights.  Under the provision, the rights are to be held in trust for the ultimate 
benefit of charity subject to a proviso:  During the first twenty-five years after his 
death, the trustee is prohibited from engaging in the exploitation of these rights.1  
Although Williams’ motivation is not known, the provision was presumably tax-
driven, based on a concern that the value of these rights would otherwise be subject 
to federal estate tax.2  Is such a provision effective?  Probably not. 
 
 1. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity:  Privacy Reimagined for New York?, 36 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 596 (2018). 
 2. See Jeffrey K. Eisen & Allan E. Biblin, Estate Planning for Clients in the Entertainment 
Business, 33 EST. PLAN. 26 (2006) (suggesting the need for celebrities to address the issue in their estate 
planning documents). 
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A. SECTION 2033:  DETERMINING THE GROSS ESTATE 
Section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code requires the inclusion in the gross 
estate of “property” in which the decedent had an interest “at the time of his death.”3  
Although the Code fails to elaborate on the meaning of this language, court decisions 
and IRS rulings indicate that a critical question is whether the decedent had 
testamentary control under state law.  State law can therefore be determinative.  
Where state law permits testamentary control of an item, it is included in calculating 
the gross estate under § 2033 (if, as will be discussed, the right accrued prior to 
death).4  Under California law, Williams could have controlled the publicity rights 
under his will.5  Therefore, had Williams simply bequeathed the right to his family 
free of any restriction, the full value of the rights would have been included in his 
gross estate.6  In contrast, had Williams’ publicity rights been based entirely on New 
 
 3. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2033 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 113–74).   
 4. See Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va 1994); Estate of Wadewitz 
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 925, 933–35 (1963) (citing Helvering v. Safe Deposit Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942)) 
(interests that terminate at death are not subject to 26 U.S.C.A. § 2033); Estate of Royce v. Comm’r, 46 
B.T.A 1090, 1094 (1942) (quoting Davis v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)) (inclusion 
under the predecessor of 26 U.S.C.A § 2033 required that the “property [was] owned by a decedent and 
passing at death by will or intestacy”) (emphasis added); Rev. Rul. 2002–39, 2002–2 C.B. 33, 2002 WL 
1277320 (I.R.C. § 2033 not applicable because “decedent had no power to designate the recipient of the 
benefit”); Paul L. Caron, Estate Planning Implications of the Right of Publicity, 68 TAX NOTES 95, 95 
(1995).   
While a regulation under I.R.C. § 2033 (Treas. Reg. § 20.2033–1(b)) does indicate that property 
subject to homestead or other exemptions under state law is includible in the gross estate without 
addressing the effect of the decedent’s lack of testamentary control, the Tax Court has held, in applying 
the regulation, that a lack-of-control discount is appropriate in valuing the property.  See Estate of Johnson 
v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 120 (1981), rev’d, 718 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1983).  In effect, the portion of the property 
subject to homestead rights and therefore beyond the decedent’s control is not subject to estate tax under 
the Tax Court’s approach.  Only the portion of the property over which the decedent had testamentary 
control is subject to tax under I.R.C. § 2033.  Id. at 126 (decedent could not “dispose of the entire 
homestead property by will without its being subject to the rights of her surviving spouse”).  But see I.R.S. 
G.C.M. 39,592 (July 8, 1986) (disagreeing with the Tax Court); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8651001 (Aug. 
8, 1986) (same). 
The Fifth Circuit, while reversing in Johnson, did not disagree with the Tax Court’s approach to 26 
U.S.C.A. § 2033.  Instead, it held that the entire value of the property, without discount, was includible 
under § 2034, obviating the need to consider § 2033.  Under § 2034, the undiscounted value of property 
subject to dower or similar statutory right is includible in the gross estate despite the decedent’s lack of 
control.  Although the Fifth Circuit did not elaborate on the relationship between §§ 2033 and 2034, the 
latter section establishes that the decedent’s lack of control is irrelevant in the context of property subject 
to dower-type rights.  In effect, § 2034 creates an exception for property subject to such rights that proves 
the general rule in § 2033 that inclusion requires testamentary control.  In short, if testamentary control 
were not an essential element under § 2033, property subject to dower-type rights would be includible 
under §§ 2033 and 2034 would be unnecessary. 
In any event, the narrow provision in 26 U.S.C.A. § 2033 regulation with respect to homestead and 
exemption should not be read to undermine the section’s general requirement of testamentary control. 
 5. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (2007). 
 6. See Estate of Andrews, 850 F. Supp.at 1293–95; Caron, supra note 4, at 95 (“The only question 
thus is whether the right of publicity is a property interest recognized under the applicable state law and 
descendible to the decedent’s heirs.”); Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood:  Estate Taxes and the 
Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 767 (1998) (“Since the estate tax is 
nominally a tax on the privilege of transferring property at death, interests which cannot be transferred at 
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York law—where, currently, the post-death right to publicity is not subject to 
testamentary control—estate tax inclusion would not have been possible.7 
The question is whether celebrities subject to California law or other similar laws 
can avoid estate tax inclusion—and the difficult battle with the IRS determining the 
value of the right8—by imposing the kind of restriction that Williams used in his will.  
While, as will be discussed, there is dicta in the Ninth Circuit that appears to provide 
support for the Williams approach, the dicta is inconsistent with basic principles.  
Indeed, the Williams bequest might have proven to be counterproductive had the IRS 
challenged it. 
Under basic principles, the gross estate is determined without regard to any 
restrictions imposed in the decedent’s will.  Thus, if the decedent had owned 100% 
of the stock in a company and bequeathed 20% to each of his five children, the value 
of 100% of the stock would be included in the gross estate—i.e., no discount would 
be permitted on account of the nature of the minority interest given to each of the 
children.9  Were the law otherwise, it would be relatively easy to depress the value 
of the gross estate through artful drafting.10  This would not only create the inequity 
of imposing a different tax on similarly situated decedents merely because they 
included different terms in the their will, but would also lead to distortions in 
planning:  A person who wanted to bequeath 100% of her stock to one child would 
 
death (i.e. which are not devisable or descendible) are not subject to the estate tax system”); Bridget J. 
Crawford, Mitchell M. Gans, & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Postmortem Rights of Publicity:  The Federal 
Estate Tax Consequences of New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 2003 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/FUK8-MR8Y; Bridget J. Crawford, Mitchell M. Gans, & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, The 
Estate Tax Fundamentals of Celebrity and Control, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 50 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/B4LF-JWK6.  But see Joshua C. Tate, Immortal Fame:  Publicity Rights, Taxation, and 
the Power of Testation, 44 GA. L. REV. 1 (2009) (maintaining that, under current law, testamentary control 
is not relevant to the applicability of § 2033). 
 7. See supra note 6. 
 8. See Estate of Andrews, 850 F. Supp. at 1287–95 (determining value of projected income stream 
based on a discount rate taking risk into account); Rothman, supra note 1, at 596 (describing the different 
positions of the IRS and the Estate of Michael Jackson on the valuation question). 
 9. See Estate of McClatchy v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 1998) (bequest to 
different legatees does not alter estate tax value); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 839 F.2d 1249, 
1255 (7th Cir. 1988) (restrictions imposed in estate planning document not taken into account for purposes 
of estate-tax valuation); Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768–69 (9th Cir. 1981) (“To 
take into account for valuation purposes the fact that the testator’s unitary holding has become divided in 
the hands of two or more beneficiaries, would invite abuse.”); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 
999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981) (“It would be strange indeed if the estate tax value of a block of stock would 
vary depending upon the legatee to whom it was devised.”); Estate of Adler v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1118 (2011) (“A property interest transferred to separate owners at death is not valued separately 
for estate tax purposes.”).  For gift tax purposes, the rule is different.  An inter vivos gift of 20% to each 
of five children would qualify each gift for a discount.  Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 C.B. 202 (embracing the 
gift-tax approach adopted in Estate of Bright, supra).  Although the IRS had long argued against discount 
in this context, and although one could argue that the same concern that animates the estate tax rule should 
have enabled the IRS to prevail, it ultimately conceded the gift-tax issue after suffering defeat in the courts 
and what might be considered a legislative defeat as well.  Id.  See also H.R. Rep. No. 101–964 (1990) 
(Conf. Report) (“[t]hese rules do not affect minority discounts or other discounts available under present 
law”—implicitly endorsing the cases rejecting the IRS position). 
 10. See Ahmanson, 674 F.2d at 768 (“[It] would invite abuse.”). 
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face the reality of a higher estate tax than if she bequeathed a minority interest to 
each of her children. 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT DICTA 
Nonetheless, in the face of this well-established principle for computing the value 
of a gross estate, the Ninth Circuit in Ahmanson Found. v. United States supplied in 
dicta a surprising answer to a hypothetical it posited:  A direction in a will requires 
the executor to destroy posthumously the decedent’s private papers.11  The court 
indicated that, in such a case, it would require only the value of the ashes be included 
in the gross estate, not the pre-destruction value of the papers.12  Given that Williams 
was a California resident, his advisers likely relied on this dicta in drafting the 
publicity-rights provision in his will, hoping the restriction on exploitation would 
suppress the value of the publicity rights for estate tax purposes.13 
The dicta, however, is of questionable validity for two reasons.  Although, as will 
be discussed, the dicta may be defensible on policy grounds, it is of questionable 
validity as a conventional matter for two reasons.  First, to support its conclusion, the 
court relied on Provident Nat’l Bank v. United States, a decision principally involving 
the calculation of the marital deduction.14  Because the deduction is equal to the 
amount passing to the spouse, the Provident court took into account in computing 
the marital deduction a will-imposed provision that impacted the value of stock 
passing as part of the marital bequest.15  Given that the dicta did not address the 
amount of a deduction but rather the valuation of an item in the gross estate—papers 
or ashes—the marital-deduction analysis is inapt.16 
Second, the dicta is inconsistent with the court’s holding that valuation for 
purposes of computing the gross estate is determined without regard to the identity 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Indeed, in a student note, the suggestion was made that, under the Ahmanson dicta, the value 
of publicity rights could be extinguished.  See Note, Federal Estate Tax and the Right of Publicity:  Taxing 
Estates for Celebrity Value, 108 HARV. L. REV. 683 (1995).  Perhaps the Williams advisers were aware 
of this Note at the time they drafted the will. 
 14. 581 F.2d 1081, 1086–87 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 15. In Provident, after discussing the valuation question in the context of computing the marital 
deduction, the court did indicate that it was necessary to use the same value for purposes of calculating 
the gross estate.  Id. at 1091.  This aspect of Provident was rejected in Ahmanson as well as in the Tax 
Court.  Estate of Chenoweth v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1577, 1588–90 (1993) (explaining the difference between 
Ahmanson and Provident on this issue and rejecting Provident in favor of Ahmanson).  See also Estate of 
McClatchy v. Comm’r, 147 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of McClatchy, 147 F.3d at 
1092–93 n.2 (reading Provident as holding that the valuation of an item in the gross estate is determined 
without regard to “directives” imposed in the will); Joseph M. Dodge, Lifting the Shroud Obscuring Estate 
of Hubert:  The Logic of the Income and Estate Tax Treatment of Estate Administration Expenses, 3 FLA. 
TAX REV. 647, 662–63 n.66 (1998) (indicating that this aspect of Provident is erroneous). 
 16. See Dodge, supra note 15, at 662–63 n.66 (indicating that the Ahmanson dicta is invalid); 
Madoff, supra note 6, 788–89 (same).  See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2033–1(b) (stating that the direction in 
will to extinguish debt owed to the decedent is disregarded for estate tax purposes). 
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of the legatees as established by the terms of the will.17  That is to say that the terms 
of the will should not affect the valuation of the gross estate.  Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit itself appears to have tacitly disavowed the dicta in a later decision.18 
C. BACK-UP PLAN:  CHARITABLE BEQUEST 
Perhaps appreciating the questionable validity of the dicta, Williams’ advisers 
included a back-up provision in the will:  a bequest of the publicity right to charity 
subject to the twenty-five-year restriction.  They presumably thought that if the IRS 
were to challenge the validity of the twenty-five-year restriction, the estate could 
claim a charitable deduction and thereby eliminate any estate tax on the publicity 
rights.19  Would this provision have been effective in a litigation with the IRS?  Not 
entirely. 
Contributions to charity are deductible for estate tax purposes.20  The advisers 
presumably hoped that, in the event the dicta were determined to be invalid, the estate 
would nonetheless be entitled to a charitable deduction for estate tax purposes in an 
amount equal to the full value of the publicity rights.  Like the marital deduction, 
however, in general, the amount of the charitable deduction is equal to the value of 
what passes to charity.21  The amount passing to charity under Williams’ will was 
equal to the value of the publicity right reduced by an amount reflecting the twenty-
five-year restriction.22  Put differently, since the charity’s enjoyment of the right 
would be postponed for twenty-five years, it would be as if charity took subject to an 
encumbrance that had the effect of suppressing the value of its interest.23 
 
 17. Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768–69 (9th Cir. 1981).  For an argument 
that any distinction between the rule that the gross estate is determined without regard to the terms of the 
will and the dicta is not convincing, see Dodge, supra note 15, at 662–63 n.66. 
 18. In Estate of McClatchy, the Ninth Circuit had occasion to invoke the dicta.  The dissent 
referenced it, arguing in effect that, based on the dicta, it would not be impermissible to consider the 
identity of the executor designated in the will in determining the value of an item in the gross estate.  147 
F.3d at 1095–96.  In refusing to consider the designation contained in the will, the majority did not attempt 
to defend the dicta or otherwise respond directly to the dissent’s point about the dicta—thus suggesting 
that it may not continue to be viable even in the Ninth Circuit. 
 19. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2055. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Dieringer v. Comm’r, No. 16–72640, 2019 WL 1119598, at *7 (9th Cir. Mar. 12. 
2019) (prohibiting “crafting an estate plan . . . so as to game the system and guarantee a charitable 
deduction that is larger than the amount actually given to charity); Ahmanson, 674 F.2d at 772; Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2055–3(a) (“[T]he deduction is based on the amount actually available for charitable uses”). 
 22. See Rev. Rul. 2003–28, 2003–1 C.B. 594, 2003 WL 480096 (“[W]hen a donor places a 
restriction on the marketability or use of property, the amount of the charitable contribution is the fair 
market value of the property at the time of the contribution determined in light of the restriction”); Rev. 
Rul. 85–99, 1985–2 C.B. 83, 1985 WL 287178 (same); Madoff, supra note 6, at 790–91 (stating that 
bequest of publicity rights subject to restriction on exploitation results in reduced charitable deduction); 
Alan F. Rothschild Jr., Planning and Documenting Charitable Gifts, 20 PROB. & PROP. 53 (2006). 
 23. Where a bequest to charity constitutes only a partial interest in the bequeathed property, the 
deduction is denied in its entirety unless certain requirements are satisfied.  26 U.S.C.A. § 2055(e)(2).  
While, on initial examination, the charitable bequest in Williams’ will might appear to be subject to full 
denial under this rule because of the twenty-five-year limitation, such a limitation should not trigger the 
full-denial rule.  See Rev. Rul. 2003–28, supra note 2222.  Instead, as indicated in text, the deduction is 
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To illustrate, assume that the value of the publicity right on the date of death was 
$100 and that its value would only be $10 once the twenty-five-year restriction was 
taken into account.  In this case, only $10 would be deductible for estate tax purposes.  
At the same time, however, under conventional principles (i.e., assuming the 
Ahmanson dicta is invalid), the amount includible in the gross estate would be $100.  
Thus, if litigation with the IRS had ensued in the Williams estate, based on these 
hypothetical values, the correct amount of the inclusion in the gross estate would 
have been $100, and the charitable deduction would have been $10. 
At first blush, this result might appear incongruous—valuing the publicity right 
at $100 in computing the gross estate while permitting a deduction of only $10.  But, 
as discussed, unlike the rule applied in valuing an item in the gross estate, the rule 
applied in computing the amount of a deduction requires that restrictions contained 
in the will be considered in arriving at the amount that passes to the beneficiary.24  
For the deduction is equal to the amount that the decedent passes or transfers to 
charity (or to a spouse in the case of the marital deduction).  Thus, if, as in this 
example, the restriction reduces value, the deduction must be correspondingly 
reduced.  So, perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, assuming the Ahmanson dicta is 
invalid, the provision in Williams’ will would not have been fully effective in 
eliminating the estate tax on Williams’ publicity rights. 
D. ALTERNATIVE PLAN:  EXTINGUISHING RIGHTS DURING LIFE 
Given the uncertainty about the dicta and the charitable deduction’s passing 
concept, what should Williams’ advisers have recommended?  A bequest to charity 
of the publicity rights free from any restriction would have resulted in a charitable 
deduction equal to the value of the rights, thus entirely negating any estate tax on the 
rights.  But, of course, this would have enabled the charity to exploit the publicity 
rights.  Indeed, given the fiduciary duty imposed on those who manage charitable 
organizations, exploitation would certainly have occurred. 
Alternatively, had Williams destroyed the rights during his life, instead of 
addressing the issue in his will—assuming a direction during life to destroy the rights 
would have been valid under state law—the rights could not have been included in 
his gross estate.  Items consumed or destroyed during life cannot be controlled by 
will at the time of death and therefore cannot be treated as the subject of a death-time 
transfer. 
 
limited to the value of what passes to charity, with the limitation having the effect of reducing this value 
and therefore the amount of the deduction.  See id. 
 24. See Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 771–73 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
item bequeathed to charity may be valued for charitable deduction purposes at less than its value for 
purposes of computing gross estate); Estate of Chenoweth v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1577, 1584–90 (1993) 
(holding that valuation for purposes of determining gross estate not equivalent to valuation for marital 
deduction purposes).  See also Rothschild, supra note 22, at 55 (“[T]he estate tax charitable deduction 
may be significantly below the property’s value for estate tax purposes.”); Dodge, supra note 15, at 662–
63 n.66.  But see Provident Nat’l Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 1081, 1091–92 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding 
that valuation of item for marital deduction purposes must equal its gross estate value). 
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E. EXTINGUISHING RIGHTS DURING LIFE FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
Although, as suggested, there are questions about the validity of the Ahmanson 
dicta, the court’s hypothetical does bear further consideration on policy grounds.  If, 
before death, a person destroys her papers—or any other asset, for that matter—only 
the value of the ashes, not the papers, would be subject to estate tax under 
conventional principles.  Were the outcome otherwise, the estate tax would extend 
beyond what the decedent leaves behind for transfer at death.25  Put differently, to 
the extent that someone consumes or otherwise destroys, intentionally or 
unintentionally, an asset during life, it cannot be included in her gross estate. 
And there is no policy justification for treating the posthumous destruction of 
papers in accordance with a direction in the will differently.  First, as a matter of 
equity, people who destroy their papers prior to death and those who accomplish it 
by a provision in their will are similarly situated.  Why should one be taxed more 
harshly than the other?  Second, a testamentary direction to destroy papers does not 
present any gaming opportunities.  Whether a person seeking post-death privacy 
accomplishes the destruction of her papers before or after death is not tax-driven and 
does not implicate the equity or distortion concerns that animate the conventional 
rule that precludes consideration of a will-imposed restriction or direction in valuing 
an item in the gross estate. 
There is simply no transfer if the property is destroyed, and whether the 
destruction occurs before death or immediately after death in accordance with the 
will should not matter.  In either case, there should be no estate-tax inclusion.  
Parenthetically, the potential for posthumously directed destruction of assets to 
proliferate is inherently limited by state law, which typically invalidates such 
directions on public policy grounds.26  In short, while the validity of the Ahmanson 
dicta remains in question, it is surely defensible on policy grounds—and is perhaps 
a reflection of the court’s tacit sensitivity to the policy implications.27 
This analysis of the destruction-of-papers issue should apply with equal force in 
the context of a posthumous direction to destroy publicity rights.  Whether private 
papers or publicity rights are under consideration, there can be no transfer if 
destruction occurs prior to death.  And, for the reasons suggested, there is no 
justification for distinguishing between pre-and post-death destruction. 
 
 25. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 48 (1900) (holding that estate tax is an excise tax on the 
transfer of wealth that passes from the decedent); Estate of Heller v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 370 (2016) 
(“The estate tax is imposed on the value of property transferred to beneficiaries”); Madoff, supra note 6, 
at 767 (stating that tax is imposed “on the privilege of transferring property at death.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (forbidding 
destruction even though the court conceded testator could have destroyed the property while alive); Matter 
of Pace, 93 Misc.2d 969 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1977); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 47 cmt. e (2003) (stating 
that destruction would be for a capricious purpose, which is not a permissible purpose for a trust); Adam 
J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes:  A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 74, 83 (1999) 
(explaining the policy justification for the rule prohibiting destruction); Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control 
After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 (2017). 
 27. Perhaps, the Ninth Circuit had these policy considerations in mind when it formulated the dicta.  
But see Dodge, supra note 15, at 662–63 n.66 (arguing that the dicta was based on an unconvincing 
distinction). 
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F. AVOIDING COERCED COMMERCIALIZATION 
To the extent that a person has publicity rights during life and they are 
transferrable at death under state law, they are subject to estate tax.  As some have 
suggested, this could result in the forced post-death commercialization of these rights 
in order to enable the beneficiaries to raise the funds to pay the estate tax.28  But if 
these rights are extinguished prior to death in accordance with state law, no transfer 
should be deemed to occur at death, and the estate tax should not apply.  Given the 
concern about forced commercialization, states that permit transfer at death should 
adopt legislation authorizing the pre-death destruction of these rights.29  This would 
provide celebrities with a choice that would eliminate coerced commercialization:  
Extinguish the rights prior to death and thereby eliminate concerns about the estate 
tax;30 or permit the rights to survive death so they can be exploited by beneficiaries, 
subject of course to the estate tax. 
At the same time, the Code should be amended to expand the opportunity to 
extinguish publicity rights without triggering the estate tax.  First, for the reasons 
suggested, posthumous destruction should be treated no less favorably than pre-death 
destruction.  Thus, the Code should embrace the Ahmanson dicta, excluding private 
papers or publicity rights from the gross estate where post-death destruction is 
directed in the will.  Second, the Code should be amended to provide for estate tax-
exclusion where publicity rights are extinguished by the beneficiaries in accordance 
with state law during a limited post-death time frame.31  Under this approach, where 
the celebrity fails to address the issue, the beneficiaries would have the ability to do 
so.  To the extent the Code adopts this approach, states would need to follow through 
 
 28. See Rothman, supra note 1, at 596; Madoff, supra note 6, at 780–82. 
 29. If the state failed to authorize such destruction, the decedent’s invalid attempt to extinguish the 
rights could not be respected for tax purposes. 
 30. Under 26 U.S.C.A. § 2501, the gift tax is imposed on the “transfer of property by gift.”  
Consistent with this fundamental proposition, the gift tax cannot apply if there is no transferee.  See 
Comm’r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[T]ax cannot be sustained unless there was a 
transferor, a transferee, and an effective transfer of title or other economic interest or benefit in property 
having the quality of a gift.”); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511–2(a) (“[The gift tax] attaches regardless of the fact 
that the identity of the donee may not then be known or ascertainable”).  Thus, where publicity rights are 
extinguished or destroyed during life, no gift tax can be imposed because there is no transferee (i.e., no 
present transferee and no future transferee who will be later ascertained). 
 31. This would be analogous to the disclaimer concept, which is addressed in 26 U.S.C.A. § 2518 
and state statutes across the country.  Note, however, the difference:  When a beneficiary disclaims, the 
property passes to an alternative beneficiary; under the suggested approach, the extinguished publicity 
rights would be extinguished and would therefore not pass to anyone.  Note also a practical difficulty with 
the suggested approach:  If the publicity rights were bequeathed to more than one beneficiary either as a 
specific or residuary gift, disagreement among the beneficiaries could result in an inability to decide 
whether or not to extinguish the rights.  A well-advised celebrity could of course, anticipating this 
problem, include a provision in the will that addressed it.  For example, the will could bequeath the 
publicity rights to one beneficiary.  Or if there are more than one beneficiary, the will could confer on one 
of the beneficiaries the right to decide whether to extinguish the rights.  State legislation might also address 
the issue.  For example, a default rule could apply in the case of multiple beneficiaries, under which 
publicity rights would be extinguished unless all (or perhaps a majority) of the beneficiaries agreed 
otherwise. 
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with conforming legislation recognizing the post-death right of the beneficiaries to 
extinguish publicity rights.32 
If the Code were amended to incorporate the suggested approach—or state law 
permitted the rights to be extinguished during life—the potential for forced 
commercialization would be eliminated.  The estate tax would only be imposed in 
those cases where a decision was made by the decedent (or the beneficiaries) not to 
extinguish the publicity rights.  And the question whether, as a matter of non-tax law, 
these rights should be transferrable could be decided on its own merit free from the 
specter of forced commercialization.33 
II. INDEPENDENT RIGHT AND WRONGFUL DEATH ANALOGY 
Legislation is currently pending in New York which would significantly alter the 
treatment of publicity rights.  Under the legislation, two separate, independent rights 
would be created:  the pre-death right to privacy and the post-death right to 
publicity.34  Indeed, the bill explicitly refers to the latter right as an independent one.  
Is it possible that the designation of publicity rights as an independent one could have 
an impact on their estate tax treatment?  Perhaps—although it seems doubtful. 
A. WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE ESTATE TAX 
Consider the estate-tax treatment of wrongful-death proceeds, which raises a 
somewhat analogous question.  In Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 
wrongful death proceeds were payable to the decedent’s estate under state law.35  On 
those occasions when the wrongful-death issue had previously arisen, the proceeds 
were found not to be includible in the gross estate.36  A critical predicate was their 
treatment under state law:  They were payable to the decedent’s intestate takers and 
could not be controlled by the decedent’s will.37 
The twist in Connecticut Bank was that, under the Connecticut statute, the 
proceeds were controllable by the decedent’s will.  The IRS argued that this 
difference was sufficient to make the proceeds includible under § 2033.  Rejecting 
this argument, the court reasoned that the wrongful-death claim did not arise until 
 
 32. Professor Madoff suggests an alternative:  that the Code be amended to permit the decedent’s 
personal representative to elect to treat certain property as being non-marketable (which would have the 
effect of significantly lowering its value for estate tax purposes).  She suggests, in addition, that a 
mechanism be adopted under which the estate tax would be “recaptured” or collected in the event the 
beneficiaries later decided to exploit the property’s market value.  See Madoff, supra note 6, at 808–10. 
 33. See id. at 808 (arguing that the estate tax should not be permitted to drive the substantive 
property law question of transferability). 
 34. See N.Y. Assemb. No. A08155, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017) available at 
https://perma.cc/XVT5-SBGZ. 
 35. 465 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 36. I.R.S. G.C.M. 36135; Rev. Rul. 54–19 1954–1 C.B. 179 (obsoleted in Rev. Rul. 2007–14, 
2007–1 C.B. 747); Maxwell Trust v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 444 (1972). 
 37. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 465 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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the decedent had died.38  The court emphasized that, under state law, no person is 
permitted to “possess an action or right of action” “during his lifetime” that has as 
an element the person’s own death.39  Put differently, a wrongful death claim requires 
as a critical element the death of the victim, which of course cannot be pleaded until 
death occurs.  The wrongful death proceeds were not, the court concluded, the subject 
of a wealth transfer by the decedent and therefore could not be subject to estate tax.40 
Having been embraced by the IRS,41 Connecticut Bank definitively establishes 
the two requirements that must be satisfied in order for § 2033 to apply:  the 
preexisting requirement of the decedent’s testamentary control under state law; and 
the new requirement introduced by the court that the decedent’s rights be acquired 
under state law before death.42  If one of these requirements is not met, the decedent 
is deemed not to have made a transfer within the meaning of § 2033.  Thus, under 
Connecticut Bank, even if state law permits the decedent to control wrongful-death 
proceeds by will, they are not includible because the right does not accrue prior to 
death. 
Contrast this with the treatment of claims that accrue pre-death and that survive 
death.  Typically, these claims are based on pain and suffering and loss of income 
during life.  Because the claims survive, the victim’s personal representative is 
permitted to pursue them post-death.43  In Connecticut Bank, the accident resulted in 
instantaneous death.  As a result, the decedent did not suffer a loss of income during 
life or pain and suffering.  Where, however, death is not instantaneous, survival 
claims based on such pre-death harms would be available.  And because, by their 
nature, survival claims accrue prior to death¾and are controllable by will¾they 
must be included in the gross estate.44 
Consider a case where death is not instantaneous.  After death, two claims are 
brought:  a claim seeking compensation loss of income during life; and a wrongful 
death claim seeking compensation for loss of income resulting from the victim’s 
premature death.  If, under the state statute, the wrongful death proceeds are payable 
to the victim’s estate and are therefore controllable by will, must the claim for lost 
income attributable to the post-death period be included in the gross estate?  To be 
sure, as indicated, the claim attributable to the pre-death period, having accrued prior 
to death, must be included.  But what about the wrongful death claim with respect to 
the post-death income loss? 
 
 38. Id. (“Simple logic mandates the conclusion that an action for wrongful death cannot exist until 
a decedent has died, at which point, he is no longer a person capable of owning any property interests.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Rev. Rul. 75–27, 1975–1 C.B. 297, 1975 WL 34813; Rev. Rul. 75–126, 1975–1 C.B. 296 1975 
WL 34812. 
 42. See Rev. Rul. 78–292, 1978–2 C.B. 233, 1978 WL 42201 (“The value of the right to amounts 
that accrue to a decedent before death and are paid after death are includible in the decedent’s gross estate 
as property in which the decedent had an interest.”). 
 43. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 926. 
 44. See Rev. Rul. 75–127, supra note 41 (“[W]here it can be established that such proceeds 
represent damages to which the decedent had become entitled during his lifetime (such as for pain and 
suffering and medical expenses) rather than damages for his premature death, the value of these amounts 
will be includible in the decedent’s gross estate.”). 
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Put differently, is the portion of the wrongful death claim based on loss of income 
attributable to the post-death period sufficiently independent of the pre-death lost-
income claim to permit its exclusion from the gross estate?  Or is it merely a 
continuation of the pre-death claim?  To the extent it is viewed as a continuation of 
the pre-death claim, should not the proceeds be included in the gross estate?  After 
all, the two conditions for inclusion under § 2033 would be satisfied:  pre-death 
accrual; and testamentary control over the proceeds. 
The IRS appears to permit the estate tax treatment of the post-death lost-income 
claim to track the state law characterization, treating it as independent of the pre-
death claim and therefore not taxable.45  Does this tracking of state law make sense?  
On the one hand, it could be argued that tracking makes a mere label supplied by 
state law determinative, in effect elevating form over substance.46  On the other hand, 
it could be argued there is a policy-based justification for excluding all wrongful 
death proceeds from the gross estate¾with this justification driving the conclusion 
that the wrongful death claim is independent of the survival claim. 
B. POLICY-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS 
First, treating wrongful death proceeds as a wealth transfer by the decedent would 
be difficult to defend given that they represent a substitute for income the decedent 
would have earned and presumably used to support her loved ones had she lived.47  
Since using one’s income to provide such support during life could not be the subject 
of a taxable wealth transfer,48 providing a substitute in the form of wrongful death 
damages for loved ones should not lead to a different outcome.49  Similarly, to the 
 
 45. See Rev. Rul. 75–127, supra note 41 (concluding that a wrongful death recovery is not 
includible in the gross estate after first stating that “[a] wrongful death action is an original and distinct 
claim for damages sustained by the statutory beneficiaries and is not a derivative of or a continuation of a 
claim existing in the decedent.”); Rev. Rul. 54–19, supra note 36 (stating that since decedent “never had 
an interest in the [wrongful death] right of action” during life, estate tax inclusion was inappropriate); 
I.R.S. G.C.M. 36135 (“The Arizona wrongful death statute provides for an original and distinct right of 
recovery, one which arises after the decedent’s death and one which is not a continuation of any rights of 
the decedent.  It is a property right not in existence as of the decedent’s death and it is this property right 
which we must consider for purposes of Code §§ 2033 and 2041.”).  Note, however, that, in I.R.S. G.C.M. 
38053, the IRS did not simply look at the state law characterization of the post-death claim as an 
independent one.  Instead, in concluding that the post-death lost-income claim was not includible, it 
determined that the post-death and pre-death claims were substantively different based on its analysis of 
the measure of damages each claim generated under state (Pennsylvania) law.  Similarly, in Rev. Rul. 75–
127, the IRS placed its emphasis on the substantive issue rather than any state law label, strongly implying 
that damages attributable to “premature death” are not includible without discussing their characterization 
under state law. 
 46. As a general matter, state law labels that lack substance are ignored for tax purposes.  See Lyeth 
v. Hoey, 304 U.S. 557 (1938); Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law:  
Does the Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871 (1999). 
 47. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925, cmt. b (indicating that, in general, the damages in a 
wrongful death reflect what decedent’s family would have received had death not occurred). 
 48. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68–379, 1968–2 C.B. 414, 1968 WL 15238; Rev. Rul. 77–314, 1977–2 C.B. 
349, 1977 WL 43812. 
 49. For an analogous concept in the income tax context, see Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm’r, 144 
F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944) (taxing damages by examining the loss for which they provide a substitute).  Note, 
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extent that wrongful death damages compensate surviving family members for the 
“loss of society” they suffer on account of the decedent’s death,50 they should not be 
treated as transfer of wealth by the decedent.51 
Second, if the Connecticut Bank court had held that the decedent’s ability to 
control the wrongful death proceeds by will was sufficient to make it includible in 
the gross estate, inequity would result:  Victims in states that permit such control 
would be required to include the proceeds in their gross estate while victims in states 
that do not permit such control¾but instead require the proceeds to go to intestate 
takers¾would avoid estate tax inclusion.  Treating similarly situated wrongful-death 
victims differently merely because of such a difference in state law would result in 
discrimination difficult to defend.52 
C. ARE POST-DEATH PUBLICITY RIGHTS INDEPENDENT FROM PRE-DEATH 
PRIVACY RIGHTS? 
Does the New York bill¾which explicitly provides that the post-death publicity 
claim is independent of the pre-death privacy claim¾create a basis for arguing that 
the publicity claims should be treated like wrongful death claims?  If the post-death 
claim is treated as separate and distinct from the pre-death claim for tax purposes, 
estate tax exclusion might plausibly be appropriate.  For, as in Connecticut Bank, 
where a claim arises under state law at death and there is therefore no pre-death right 
to the claim, the decedent should not be viewed as having made a transfer.53  Under 
 
however, that some argue that it is difficult to justify the estate-tax exclusion of wrongful death proceeds 
from the gross estate to the extent the damages are attributable to lost wages.  See Tate, supra note 6, at 
n.283 (citing Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax 
Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653, 663 (1988), for this proposition). 
 50. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585–89 (1974) (discussing the availability of 
loss-of-society damages under state law). 
 51. In addition, the exclusion of wrongful death proceeds from the gross estate could plausibly be 
justified on the basis of sympathy for the victims.  Section 104 analogously excludes personal injury 
damages from gross income.  The policy justification for the personal-injury exclusion is a matter of 
debate, but some point to sympathy as a basis for the exclusion.  See, e.g., Mary L. Heen, An Alternative 
Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes:  
Income from Human Capital, Realization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 560–61 (1994); F. 
Philip Manns Jr., Restoring Tortiously Damaged Human Capital Tax Free Under Internal Revenue Code 
Section 104(a)(2)’s New Physical Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 354–55 (1998).  The same 
justification could explain the exclusion of wrongful death proceeds from the gross estate. 
 52. The Connecticut Bank court betrayed its concern that a contrary result could produce 
unwarranted discrimination, stating that the “differences in results under the two types of statutes may be 
more theoretical than real . . . .”  Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 465 F.2d 760, 763 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
 53. Id.  In Connecticut Bank, the IRS argued that estate-tax inclusion was required on two 
alternative theories:  26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2033 and 2041.  The latter section applies where the decedent had a 
general power of appointment (i.e., where the decedent could have exercised it in favor of herself, her 
creditors, her estate or the creditors of her estate).  Because the decedent’s creditors could have reached 
the wrongful death proceeds under Connecticut law, the decedent would have been treated as having a 
general power and inclusion would have therefore been required under § 2041 had the claim come into 
existence prior to death.  Id. at 763–65.  Similarly, in the case of publicity rights, § 2041 could 
apply¾assuming that the decedent’s creditors could reach the rights (or their proceeds) or some other 
basis for inclusion under the section were present¾only if the rights were deemed to accrue pre-death.  
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the New York bill, no person while living could bring an action based on the post-
death claim.  As in the case of a wrongful death claim, given the language of the bill, 
a critical element of the claim would be an allegation that death had already occurred.  
Moreover, to the extent that it is appropriate to track for tax purposes the state law’s 
characterization of the right,54 the independent status of the post-death right under 
the bill supports the argument against inclusion. 
The counter-argument:  Whatever one may say about the relationship between a 
wrongful death claim and a pre-death lost-income claim, a state statute proclaiming 
that the post-death publicity right is independent of the pre-death privacy right is a 
mere label lacking in substance.  The pre-death right is cultivated during life and 
given protection under state law.  And this protection is continued in the form of the 
post-death right. 
This is analogous to a state statute that confers rights on the owner of property 
and goes on to provide that, after the death of the owner, rights with respect to the 
property must be pursued as an independent claim by those designated in the owner’s 
will.  If substance is to prevail over form, property subject to such a statute would 
surely be included in the owner’s gross estate.  In other words, the use of the label 
“independent” should not have the effect of eliminating the property from the 
owner’s gross estate.  Similarly, designating the post-death right as independent from 
the pre-death privacy right should not have any effect on the question of estate tax 
inclusion. 
Moreover, to the extent that the post-death right is freely transferrable during 
life¾as the New York bill provides¾labeling the right an independent one is 
without substance.  A wrongful death claim, in contrast, is a mere expectancy until 
the claim accrues at death and, as a result, is generally not capable of pre-death 
transfer.55  Its characterization as an independent right is consequently more 
substantive¾though, as suggested, whether it is truly substantive is certainly 
debatable.56  Thus, the labeling of a post-death-publicity right as independent should 
not carry any estate tax significance, particularly where it is freely transferable during 
life. 
In short, however one views the relationship between a wrongful death claim and 
a pre-death-lost-income claim, the argument that post-death publicity claims are 
substantively independent from their pre-death counterpart is not very compelling.  
And, indeed, there is no authority—other than in the wrongful-death context—
 
And if the decedent had § 2041-type rights and they accrued pre-death, inclusion would result under the 
section even if the decedent lacked testamentary control.  See Estate of Dietz v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1058 (1996).  If, for example, the decedent’s publicity rights could be reached by creditors under state 
law, inclusion under § 2041 would be appropriate provided the rights were deemed to exist prior to death, 
even if the decedent lacked testamentary control. 
 54. In Connecticut Bank, the court emphasized that, under state law, a wrongful death claim cannot 
be possessed by anyone while still alive.  Connecticut Bank, 465 F.2d at 763. 
 55. See Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Donative Transfers § 2.6, cmt. j. 
 56. See I.R.S. G.C.M. 38053 (indicating that wrongful death damages, concerning lost income for 
the post-death period, are not includible, with the IRS referencing the state law characterization of the 
claim as an “independent” one but also acknowledging that the claim is viewed as a “continuation of the 
rights possessed by the decedent during life”). 
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suggesting that post-death claims that are subject to testamentary control can or 
should be excluded from the gross estate merely because state law characterizes the 
claim as independent from its pre-death counterpart.  And it would, indeed, be 
surprising if post-death publicity rights that are subject to testamentary control could 
be excluded from the gross estate merely because state law characterizes them as 
independent from their pre-death counterpart.57 
III. ANCILLARY ESTATE TAX ISSUES 
As the treatment of publicity rights transitions under state law, two ancillary issues 
could arise:  1) the effect of legislation that retroactively creates transferability; and 
2) the effect of new choice-of-law principles.  This part will briefly consider these 
two issues. 
A. RETROACTIVITY 
At the time Prince died, he was domiciled in Minnesota, which did not permit 
testamentary control over publicity rights.58  After his death, legislation was 
apparently proposed that would have permitted testamentary control under 
Minnesota law.59  Apparently, one of the primary reasons the bill failed was a 
concern about the estate tax implications.60  What would have been the estate tax 
outcome for the Prince estate had the legislation been enacted on a retroactive basis 
i.e., applicable to the Prince estate even though he died before enactment?61 
As suggested, § 2033 requires not only testamentary control but also pre-death 
rights.62  To the extent that the right first accrues after the decedent’s death, the 
section is inapplicable,63 which is consistent with an essential aspect of the estate tax:  
If the right does not accrue until after death, the decedent cannot be viewed as having 
made a transfer.  Put differently, until the enactment of the legislation, the hope that 
post-death publicity rights could prove to be enforceable through legislation is a mere 
expectancy¾which is not includible in the gross estate.64 
 
 57. See Madoff, supra note 6, at 808 (indicating that estate tax inclusion of publicity rights turns 
solely on the issue of testamentary control); Caron, supra note 4, at 95. 
 58. See Rothman, supra note 1, at 594. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. In the litigation over publicity rights in the Marilyn Monroe estate, legislation enacted after her 
death permitted testamentary control on a retroactive basis.  See Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG 
Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Post-death legislation was similarly invoked in 
litigation in involving the Jimi Hendrix estate.  Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 
766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 762 F.3d 829 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 62. See supra Part 1.A. 
 63. See Estate of Barr v. Comm’r, 40 T.C. 227 (1963). 
 64. See id. at 233 (“[It] was a mere expectancy that his widow would receive the payment [and] it 
is not includible as a part of his gross estate.”). 
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B. CHOICE OF LAW 
As a traditional matter, the transferability of post-death publicity rights is 
determined under the law of the decedent’s domicile.65  Thus, if the decedent was 
domiciled in a state that does not permit transferability, there could be no estate tax 
inclusion under the traditional approach.  But under the New York bill, when a post-
death act or event occurs in New York, New York law applies.66 
Assume, for example, that the decedent was domiciled in a traditional state.  
While, at first blush, this would appear to preclude transferability and therefore 
estate-tax inclusion, the estate would nevertheless need to consider the possible 
application of New York law.  For, to the extent an act or event were to occur in New 
York post-death, New York courts would apply its law and permit the claim to be 
enforced by the decedent’s transferee.  Even though the decedent was domiciled in a 
traditional state, the possibility that such a claim might arise would need to be taken 
into account in determining the gross estate¾although the value of the claim might 
be very difficult to establish given the uncertainty, at the time of death, of an act or 
event occurring in New York. 
IV. BROADER ESTATE TAX REFORM 
How should a post-death publicity right be treated for estate tax purposes?  
Whatever the state law label, the question should be whether wealth passes to the 
decedent’s loved ones based on the efforts of the decedent.67  Where that occurs by 
reason of the decedent’s ability to control the claim by will, estate tax inclusion 
should be the result.  Were it otherwise, inequity would occur.  Compare an 
entrepreneur who has built a business and created goodwill having a value of $30 
million with a celebrity who has established a brand based on her name and 
recognition of an equal value.  Why should the celebrity be treated more favorably 
than the entrepreneur?  There would be no plausible justification for such 
discrimination. 
Based on valuation and administrative convenience concerns, however, a different 
model might make sense.68  To the extent that the publicity right is included in the 
estate, the beneficiary receives a basis in the asset equal to its value on the date of 
death.69  The beneficiary is then entitled to amortize the basis¾taking deductions 
against the income from exploiting the publicity right.70  In a rough sense, the 
 
 65. See, e.g., Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 
2012) (applying traditional rule).  See also Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
 66. While the district court in Experience Hendrix held such a choice-of-law rule unconstitutional, 
788 F. Supp. 2d at 1141–42, the Ninth Circuit reversed on this point.  762 F.3d at 835–37. 
 67. To the extent, however, that the claim is extinguished before death¾or perhaps even 
posthumously by reason of a direction in the will or by the consent of the beneficiaries¾publicity rights 
should not be included in the gross estate.  See notes supra 28-33 and accompanying text. 
 68. For a discussion of the difficulties encountered in valuing publicity rights, see Andrews v. 
United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va 1994). 
 69. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1014. 
 70. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 197; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199949037 (Dec. 10, 1999) (permitting 
amortization of intangibles inherited by the taxpayer). 
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amortization prevents the income generated by the publicity right from being taxed 
under both the estate tax and the income tax.  Given the difficulties in valuing the 
publicity right at the time of death and the possible lack of liquid assets with which 
to pay the tax, a model that permits an exclusion from the estate tax for the publicity 
right while requiring full inclusion of the proceeds from exploiting the publicity right 
to be included in income could be attractive.  However, were this model adopted, 
equity would require that it not be made specific to publicity rights but rather be 
made available to entrepreneurs’ goodwill and other similar assets, as well.71 
V. CONCLUSION 
Making publicity rights transferable at death does not inevitably lead to coerced 
commercialization.  To the extent that state law permits the rights to be extinguished 
during life—or to the extent that the Code is amended to recognize post-death 
destruction of the right by the beneficiaries or by a direction in the celebrity’s 
will¾forced commercialization will not occur.  And once the specter of forced 
commercialization is eliminated, the question of transferability can be addressed on 
its own terms based on non-tax considerations.  In addition, given the difficulties in 
valuing publicity rights, broader reform should be undertaken.  Under current law, 
the projected value of the rights as measured on the date of death are subject to estate 
tax, whereas to a large extent no income tax is imposed on the actual proceeds 
received by the beneficiaries on account of the exploitation of the rights.  If the 
projected value of the rights were excluded from the estate and actual proceeds were 
instead subject to the income tax, the system would be easier to administer and the 
risk of taxing estates on the value of rights that might well prove to be worth less 
than anticipated would be eliminated.  Replacing the estate tax with an income tax 
on the proceeds actually received by the beneficiaries would therefore be a welcome 
change. 
 
 71. Under an alternative approach, taxpayers could be given an election:  To include the projected 
value of the rights in the estate or to instead include the actual proceeds from exploiting the rights in 
income. 
